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tion, and cruel and unusual punishment, to name just a few. It can
only be suggested that the Court will employ a case-by-case approach
similar to that used by the "fundamentalist" justices 6 1 in applying the
Bill of Rights to the states.
ROBERT D.

PELTZ

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUIRES DISCLOSURE
OF IRS LETTER RULINGS
Tax Analysts & Advocates, a public interest law firm, petitioned
the Internal Revenue Service' for disclosure of certain letter rulings,
technical advice memoranda, and related communications. 2 These had
been issued by the Service to producers of certain minerals regarding
the Service's determination of which processes were "mining" within
the meaning of subsection 613(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. 3 After
its petition was denied, and other administrative alternatives exhausted, Tax Analysts & Advocates sued in federal district court
to compel disclosure of the rulings under the Freedom of Information Act. 4 The IRS contended that these rulings were not within the
scope of the Act, and, alternatively, that they were specifically exempt
from disclosure. The district court rejected both of these positions and
ordered disclosure of the letter rulings, technical advice memoranda,.
61. Mr. Justice Harlan, one of the Court's staunchest fundamentalists, defined fundamentalism by saying that it
start[s] with the words "liberty" and "due process of law" and attempt[s] to define them
in a way that accords with American traditions and our system of government. This
approach, involving a much more discriminating process of adjudication than does
"incorporation," is ... the one that was followed throughout the 19th and most of the
present century. It entails a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion," seeking, with due recognition of constitutional tolerance for state experimentation and
disparity, to ascertain those "immutable principles . . . of justice which inhere in the
very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968). Justice Harlan continued by pointing out that
"[t]he logically critical thing ... was not that the rights had been found in the Bill of Rights, but
that they were deemed, in the context of American legal history, to be fundamental." Id. at 179.
1. Hereinafter referred to as the IRS or Service.
2. "A [letter] 'ruling' is a written statement issued to a taxpayer . . . which interprets and
applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts." 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(2) (1974). It is requested by
a taxpayer who desires to know in advance the tax consequences of a proposed action.
A technical advice memorandum is issued by the National Office of the IRS to a District
Director who requests advice regarding treatment of a specific set of facts contained in a return
filed by a taxpayer. Id., § 601. 105(b)(5) (1974).
The communications involved included correspondence to and from the IRS in regard to the
rulings sought, memoranda of conferences, telephone calls and index-digest card summaries.
Hereinafter the foregoing will be collectively referred to as rulings except where otherwise
indicated.
3. 26 U.S.C. § 613(c) (1970). This subsection deals with the computation of gross income
from property for percentage depletion purposes.
4. 5 U,.S.C. § 552 (1970).
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and other communications.' On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals, D.C. Circuit, the IRS did not challenge the district court's
finding that the rulings fell within the purview of the Act, but
reasserted its exemption argument. 6 The court of appeals held modified in part and remanded: Letter rulings are not specifically exempted
by statute and, therefore, must be disclosed; however, technical advice
memoranda are exempt and need not be disclosed. Tax Analysts &
Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The Freedom of Information Act became law on July 4, 1967. 7
The purpose of the Act was to expand public access to governmental
records held by administrative agencies, intending thereby to increase
public knowledge and confidence in the governmental decision-making
8
process and to facilitate dealings with administrative agencies.
The Act expressly divides the information required to be made
available into three categories: (1) material having general applicability, which must be published in the FederalRegister;9 (2) those statements of policy and interpretations adopted by an agency and not
published in the Federal Register, which must be indexed and made
available for public inspection and copying;' 0 and (3) identifiable records, which must be made available on request." The Act also
provides for nine specific exemptions, or categories of material for
which disclosure cannot be compelled.12 Three of these exemptions
were relied on by the IRS in Tax Analysts. These were: (1) matters
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (2) trade secrets and
confidential financial information; and (3) inter- or intra-agency
memoranda.
In keeping with its remedial purpose, the courts liberally construe
the Act in favor of disclosure. 13 Conversely, the provisions for exemp4
tion are specific, limited in scope, and should be narrowly construed.1
The foregoing would appear to offer a strong case for compelling
5
disclosure of IRS letter rulings and technical advice memoranda.'
5. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973).

6. The IRS apparently also did not challenge, and the court of appeals did not discuss, the
lower court's ruling as to the related communications requiring disclosure absent a showing, by in
camera production of the documents, that they fell within the exemption for inter-agency
memoranda. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
8. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir.
1972).

9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).

12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
13. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Fisher v. Renegotiation Board, 473
F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
14. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
15. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3A.9 (1970 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; Reid, Public Access to Internal Revenue Service Rulings, 41 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 23 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Reid]; Oran, Public Disclosure of Internal Revenue Service
Private Letter Rulings, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 832 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Oran].
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Public confidence in the equitable administration of the tax system has
been weakened by the widely-held view that preferential treatment is
afforded to certain taxpayers, particularly those in high-income brackets and those representing special interests. 16 Publication of these
rulings, by providing the public with full disclosure of the reasoning
behind IRS policy determinations, might help to allay these fears of
favoritism. Public confidence in the tax system would thereby be
increased, a confidence vitally necessary for the effective functioning of
a system largely dependent on the public's trust and voluntary cooperation.
Significantly, certain tax lawyers have always had access to some
letter rulings. A common practice is to exchange these among attorneys; letter rulings have even been published in various tax journals. 17
This obvious interest by taxpayers and their attorneys in letter
rulings issued to others attests to the usefulness of free access to them.
Fairness would seem to dictate that all taxpayers-not merely those
who can afford elite representation-should have equal opportunity to
obtain these rulings. Furthermore, public disclosure of these documents would encourage closer public scrutiny and criticism of IRS
actions, in keeping with the goal of open debate of18governmental policy
which representative democracy seeks to foster.
The Service, nevertheless, has raised several policy objections to
publication of letter rulings. 19 First, these rulings have no precedential
value in that only the taxpayer to whom the ruling is issued has a right
to rely on it. Second, if these rulings were generally disclosed and
relied upon as precedent by the public, extensive review of each ruling
would be necessary before its issuance, thus resulting in delay and
prolonged uncertainty to the concerned taxpayer. 20 Third, since letter
rulings are not to be regarded as precedent, disclosure would not in
any useful way add to the public's information regarding IRS policy.
Finally, the public is amply made aware of IRS policy through issuance of revenue rulings, 2 ' the only rulings the Service regards as
having precedential value.
These arguments are unpersuasive and are belied by both the practices of the IRS itself and those of tax lawyers. Of the large number of
letter rulings issued each year, only a small number are published as
revenue rulings, 2 2 but the IRS itself divides unpublished letter rulings
into those which have reference value and those which do not. Those
falling into the former group are filed and indexed by the IRS for the
use of its agents in deciding future questions. 23 This, in addition to the
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Reid, supra note 15, at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 36.
See Uretz, The Freedom of Information and the IRS, 20 ARK. L. REV. 283 (1967).
Id. at 288.
Id.
Oran, supra note 15, at 836.
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973).
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actions of tax practitioners in seeking out and circulating past rulings,

demonstrates that disclosure of these rulings would be a valuable
addition to the public's store of information, notwithstanding the Service's contrary assertions.
The IRS has additionally contended that, in order to preserve the
confidentiality of taxpayer returns, identifying details contained in the
rulings would have to be deleted prior to publication, resulting in a
greatly increased administrative burden and delay. This argument,
however, runs counter to both the policy of encouraging public disclosure of governmental action despite the oft-claimed increases in "administrative burden," and the practical realization that not all taxpayers would seek confidentiality. The SEC, for instance, discloses all
of its no-action letters without deleting identifying details. 24 One who
requests such a letter from the SEC may apply for a 90-day period of
non-disclosure by demonstrating appropriate need for confidentiality.
If the request is denied the party may withdraw his request for a
letter.2 5 It is suggested that a similar procedure could be implemented
26
by the IRS without undue burden.
In challenging the IRS policy objections to disclosure, Tax
Analysts & Advocates invoked that provision of the Act requiring
disclosure of policy statements and interpretations adopted by the
agency and not published in the Federal Register which must be
indexed and made available for public inspection and copying.2 7 In
holding that the letter rulings and technical advice memoranda were
"interpretations" within the meaning of that section, and were therefore subject to disclosure, the district court's decision was clearly in
accord with the wording and policy of the Act. The IRS had contended that only those rulings which are "precedent12 8 were "interpretations" under the Act. As the district court pointed out, however, the
only authority for such a position was a house report on the Act
which was "contradictory" to the express terms of the statute. 29 The
court cited Professor Davis' treatise where, in discussing the Act, he
criticized this position which had been initially set forth in a
memorandum by the Attorney General.
This statement, in my opinion, is not the law, even though
the Attorney General's Memorandum, without explanation,
quotes it with approval. It is contrary to the needs of fairness, contrary to the House Committee's earlier statements,
24. 17 C.F.R. § 200.81 (1974).

25. Id.
26. The IRS has, in fact, recently announced that it will no longer issue private letter rulings
unless a taxpayer waives confidentiality. The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1974, at 1, Col. 5.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
28. 26 C.F.R. § 601.701-2 (1974).

29. 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973). For a more complete discussion of this point see
DAVIS, supra note 15.
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contrary to the report of the Senate Committee, and contrary
to the clear words of the statute. 3 0
The lower court correctly noted that had it not found these rulings
to be interpretations within the meaning of subsection (a)(2) of the Act,
they were nevertheless requested, identifiable records within the meaning of subsection (a)(3). 3 1 But if the rulings were deemed merely
"records," it would be necessary to know of a particular ruling's
existence in order to provide the identifying details necessary to obtain
it. However, by classifying these rulings as interpretations, rather than
merely as records, the court made them subject to the indexing requirements of subsection (a)(2). 3 2 In thus requiring the indexing of the
rulings, the court significantly increased their usefulness to taxpayers
by guaranteeing the creation of a procedure by which a taxpayer could
readily discover the existence of any ruling applicable to his particular
fact situation.
On appeal, the district court's classification of the letter rulings
and technical advice memoranda as interpretations was not challenged
by the IRS. It chose, instead, to contest only the holding that these
rulings were not "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute"
under subsection (b)(3) of the Act. 3 3 The IRS argued that these rulings
were part of tax returns under Internal Revenue Code sections 610334
and 721335 providing for confidentiality of returns and thus were
exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act. However, as Judge Davies pointed out in the court of
appeals decision, these Internal Revenue Code sections were intended
to protect a taxpayer's privacy as to the financial information required
in filing a return. 36 In deciding that a letter ruling is not in fact part of
a return, the appellate court stated:
The fact that taxpayers may elect to follow the Internal
30. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 131.
31. 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973).

32. Each agency also shall maintain and make available for public inspection and
copying a current index providing identifying information for the public as to any

matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by this para-.
graph to be made available or published.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
34. Returns made with respect to taxes .. .shall constitute public records; but, except
as hereinafter provided in this section, they shall be open to inspection only upon order
of the President and under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate and approved by the President.
26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(1) (1970).
35. It shall be unlawful . . . to divulge . . . the amount or source of income, profits,

losses, expenditures, or any particular thereof, set forth or disclosed in any income
return, or to permit any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any
abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided
by law; and . .. to print or publish in any manner whatever not provided by law any
income return, or any part thereof or source of income profit, losses, or expenditures
appearing in any income return.
26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) (1970).
36. 505 F.2d at 354; see also Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 20 F.R.D. 156, 158
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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Revenue Service's recommendations that letter rulings be
attached to returns . . . does not deprive a letter ruling of its

separate status as a "fi'Aal opinion" and "interpretation"
nor
37
does it make the attachment part of a return.
Thus, the confidentiality provisions in the Internal Revenue Code do
not exempt letter rulings from disclosure under the Act.
The same, however, is not the case with technical advice
memoranda. The court of appeals noted that these "deal directly with
information contained in 'returns made with respect to taxes' and are a
"38
part of the process by which tax'determinations are made ....
Therefore, the court reasoned, these memoranda fall within the express provisions of IRC section 6103 and are specifically exempt from
disclosure.
By relying on reasoning similar to that used in declaring letter
rulings not exempt, the court might well have held that technical
advice memoranda must be disclosed. Technical advice memoranda
may be considered "interpretations" or "instructions to staff that affect
a member of the public" within the meaning of the Act. 39 The same
section of the Act also provides that
[t]o the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an opinion,
statement
of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instrud40
tion.
Although not articulated in the opinion, the element of compulsion seems clearly to be a distinguishing factor between the treatment
of letter rulings and a tax return. A taxpayer must, under penalty of
law, file a tax return, whereas a request for a letter ruling is a wholly
voluntary act on behalf of a taxpayer seeking guidance from the IRS.
Furthermore, a similar distinction can be drawn between letter rulings
and technical advice memoranda. Again, a taxpayer may seek a letter
ruling if he feels such advance advice would be of use to him in his
business planning or the preparation of his returns, but he is under no
duty or compulsion to do so. If letter rulings are hereafter to be
published, a taxpayer to whom confidentiality is of paramount importance may choose to forego the option of requesting one. In contrast, a
technical advice memorandum is issued by the national office of the
IRS subsequent to the compulsory filing of an income tax return, with
no action on the part of the taxpayer to whom it pertains. Having been
forced to disclose confidential information in his return, it might be
argued, the taxpayer should be protected against further invasion of
37. 505 F.2d at 354.
38. Id. at 355.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).

40. Id. (emphasis added).
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his financial privacy through the publication of a technical advice
memorandum based on his return.
Nevertheless, unwarranted disclosure of personal financial information could be avoided by the simple expedient of a deletion procedure as outlined in the Act. 4 1 This would, it is suggested, more closely
harmonize the confidentiality policy of the Internal Revenue Code with
the policy of fullest possible disclosure under the Act.
The IRS additionally asserted as applicable a specific exemption
in the Act for confidential financial or commercial information. 4 2 The
trial court held that this exemption applied only to information that is
" 'independently confidential' and not susceptible to being rendered
anonymous. '43 The IRS was allowed thirty days in which to demonstrate by in camera production of the items sought that these
requirements for non-disclosure were met. The court of appeals
affirmed this finding emphasizing that this procedure was still available as to all documents other than the technical advice memoranda.
The Tax Analysts decision continues the trend of broad construction of the Freedom of Information Act and opens yet another body of
private law to public scrutiny. The court of appeals, however, would
have better served the purposes of the Act by construing its exemptions more narrowly to require disclosure of technical advice
memoranda as well as letter rulings.
Although it was not held that these rulings were precedent to be
relied upon by tax lawyers in future cases, it was noted by the district
court that past rulings are persuasive as to the interpretation held by
the IRS. Thus, while the service is free to change a position taken in a
letter ruling, if it later finds the interpretation therein erroneous,
arbitrary changes would be open to challenge in court. 44 Past rulings
will therefore be valuable evidence for a taxpayer who has relied on an
earlier letter ruling.
BARBARA ANN SILVERMAN
41. "To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,
an agency may delete identifying details .... ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970). This was the
procedure in Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 425 F.2d 578 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), a case also involving confidential financial information.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
43. 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (D.D.C. 1973).
44. Id. at 1303.

